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Abstract
The last twenty years have seen increasing levels of foreign direct investment
(FDI) throughout the world. In the last ten years in particular, the developing
economies of the world have become increasingly important sinks for that FDI,
China (the PRC) in particular. In 2002, China’s realised FDI reached $52.7bn,
thereby exceeding the USA’s FDI inflow for the first time in the modern era and
making it the world’s largest FDI attractor.
Within China the Yangtze Delta has been a major FDI sink. The historic city of
Nanjing lies within that region. This paper examines Nanjing’s comparative FDI
success within China (it is not as successful as might be expected); seeks to
identify the ‘regional’ specific advantages (rsa) of the city and its attendant
neighbourhood; and hence to assess the future FDI potential for the city and
map out an outline strategy for its delivery.
The analysis centres on two  models, suitably modified to apply to evaluating
the ‘Nanjing region’. As well as secondary data, primary data to enable the
evaluation were collected by means of a questionnaire administered to foreign
invested enterprises in the municipality and a small number of interviews with
officials and businessmen.
It was found that, while the city currently ‘underperforms’ as an FDI attractor, it
has certain rsa’s which it is suggested could be used to craft a strategy for
enhanced, future performance. It is suggested that, at least initially, such a
strategy should focus on three ‘core’ or ‘pillar’ industries and that the relative
proximity of Shanghai should be seen and hence used as a potential asset rather
than a threat. To facilitate the achievement of such a strategy it is also proposed
that Nanjing: should improve its self promotion; and could gain from
promoting full transparency as an attractor element.
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Gaining a Share of China’s FDI Inflow: the Case of
Nanjing
Introduction
The last twenty years have seen increasing levels of foreign direct investment
(FDI) throughout the world. In the last ten years in particular, the developing
economies of the world have become increasingly important sinks for that FDI.
China (the PRC) is one such developing economy. 
Its performance as an ‘attractor’ for FDI has been, in aggregate terms,
outstanding. The historic, high spot for China in its ability to attract FDI came
in 2002, when it became the world’s largest sink for FDI for the first time. In
2002, China’s realised FDI reached $52.7bn (see eg The Financial Times, 2003),
and thereby exceeded the USA’s FDI inflow for the first time in the modern era.
This was both a spectacular achievement and an event rich in symbolism. It was
perhaps an important marker on the PRC’s road to a key position in a world
economy dominated since World War II by the triad economies, ie North
America, the EU and Japan. However, the picture is not one of uniform
achievement. In per capita terms, China has not been as successful as some
other, developing countries, such as Brazil for example (see Table 1).
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Table 1: 
Relative Attraction of FDI per capita in Selected Countries (US$m)
Zone/Country 2003
Est Pop in 1995 1999 2002
millions
Developing Countries 4950 22.83 42.37 32.32
China 1300 27.89 31.43 40.54
Brazil 176 57.40 179.43 96.60
Vietnam 80 29.36 20.11 28.75
Foreign direct investment has flowed particularly strongly into certain regions of
China, such as the Pearl River delta and the Yangtze River delta, as multi-
national enterprises have been lured by the potentially huge domestic market,
relatively well educated population, low-cost labour forces and so on. As Scott
says: “We seem to be entering a phase of capitalist development in which the
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regional concentration of production is becoming more pronounced as a mode
of spatial economic organisation”, (Scott, 1996: 409). This theme of
regionalisation is taken up by Rugman (2000); he asserts that the great majority
of multinational enterprises’ manufacturing and service activity is organised
regionally, not globally, and is concentrated in or near the triad economies. 
Moreover, the industrial distribution of this inbound foreign direct investment
within a country is often uneven, differing among and also within regions and
areas (Wallace, 2000: 223). Yao (2003) states that the Yangtze River delta is
beginning to realise its latent industrial and commercial potential, and is set to
become China’s growth centre. The Yangtze River Delta region includes several
of the most productive cities and provinces in eastern China, including:
Shanghai, Nanjing, Suzhou, Wuxi in Jiangsu Province; and Hangzhou and
Ningbo in Zhejiang Province. According to the 2002 statistics, Shanghai
remains the city (or municipality) attracting the highest level of FDI in China -
it attracted a record $50.3 million in foreign direct investment in 2002, while
Suzhou, Wuxi, and Nanjing utilised respectively $48.12 million, $17.4 million
and $15.02 million in FDI over the same period [Municipal Government
reporting (MGR) - Nanjing, Shanghai, Suzhou, Wuxi, 2002]. 
Among the cities mentioned Nanjing is special, in a way, because of its historical
importance, both in the times of the Ming dynasty and more recently as China’s
capital in the immediately pre-Communist period of the 20th century. At the
lower reaches of the Yangtze River, 300 km west of Shanghai, Nanjing is the
largest inland river harbour in China and enjoys good rail and highway links
with Shanghai. By the end of 2001, Nanjing had received foreign direct
investment from 77 countries and regions, with a contracted amount of $10.8
billion and the amount now actually utilised, nearly $5.68 billion. By the end of
2002, 39 of the world’s 500 largest multinational enterprises had invested in
Nanjing, opening 65 companies, including Sharp of Japan, Siemens of
Germany, Ericsson of Sweden, Phillips of Holland, Fiat of Italy and CocaCola of
the United States (Wang, 2003).
Against this backcloth, it might be expected that Nanjing would be particularly
successful but such is not the case at present, certainly against the benchmark of
the dominant force in the Yangtze Delta, Shanghai, and also relative to the city’s
own aspirations for its future in the 21st century.
In this paper we shall seek to:
◆ assess the comparative FDI success of Nanjing within China 
◆ identify the ‘regional’ specific advantages of the city of
Nanjing that are attracting foreign investors now and/or
could do in the future; and, hence, 
◆ determine the possible potential for foreign direct
investment in Nanjing in the future and to map a strategy
for achieving that potential in outline.
The remainder of the paper is organised in four sections dealing respectively
with: the research methods used; the background of the city and its FDI status
in aggregate, economic activity terms; its current competences and FDI potential
using certain defined frameworks such as Foster’s (2002) FDI-screen and an
adaptation of the Porter (1990) diamond; a proposed strategy for improvement
of the city’s FDI performance; and a brief conclusion. 
Research Approach
Much of the data used in the paper is secondary data culled from a wide variety
of sources from within China and beyond. However, there is also some primary
data the bulk of which came from a survey of the foreign invested enterprises
(FIEs) with FDI projects current in Nanjing in July 2003, whose foreign
invested element derived from MNEs who rank among the world’s largest 500
such enterprises. In addition, there were a limited number of interviews - both
formal and informal - with city officials and staff in FIEs. The interviews, but
especially the informal ones, were possible by virtue of the second author’s
employment in China.
According to Nanjing Municipal Government data, there were 65 such FIEs at
that time. The foreign ownership was linked to 39 top 500 MNEs. A simple
questionnaire was administered to senior general or HR managers to elicit the
scale of enterprises, reasons for choosing Nanjing, and satisfaction with the
project/s, both in overall terms and with respect to staff performance. Because of
the relatively crude nature of the data, the analysis performed on it was
straightforward - frequency charts, cross tabulations and x2 contingency tests.
The two main frameworks used were, as noted earlier, adaptations of those of
Foster (2002) and Porter (1990). The Foster FDI-screen was developed with the
intention of providing an holistic tool, when used in conjunction with standard
financial appraisal tools, to assist companies in evaluating potential FDI projects.
The screen comprises six attributes, each of them multifaceted:
◆ F1: infrastructure adequacy
◆ F2: power adequacy
◆ F3: labour adequacy
◆ F4: cultural distance of host from ‘home’ context
◆ F5: market potential
◆ F6: country risk.
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Each attribute is assigned a Likert-style, subjective scoring scale. For attributes
except F4 and F6, the scales have a positive orientation; for the two noted the
orientation is negative (or the scales can be made positive by considering the
complements of the attributes, ie [Fj]c, for j = 4, 6).
It is not hard to see that the screen can be adapted to apply to a chosen venue
for potential projects generally, or better in a particular industry segment or
small set of segments. This was the fashion in which the framework was used in
this research. It had previously been trialled successfully for such use in the case
of the Turkish auto industry (Foster and Alkan, 2003).
Porter (1990) proposed his National Diamond as a framework for evaluating the
potential of a country, in respect of a given industry segment, to establish itself
successfully overseas in that segment. We recall that the four corners of the
diamond were:
◆ firm strategy/structure and rivalry (1)
◆ demand conditions (2)
◆ related and supporting industries (3)
◆ factor conditions/infrastructure (4)
(all in relation to the home economy of the would be investor country). In this
study, we use what may be thought of as an ‘inverse’ diamond, outlined in
Foster (2002), whereby the same ‘corners’ are construed in terms of the potential
host economy. We further modify the framework in two ways:
◆ we apply the inverse diamond to a region within a country
(a micro-economy so to speak), namely the Greater Nanjing
Municipality
◆ further, we adapt the double diamond thinking of Rugman
and collaborators, see for example Rugman and Cruz (1993)
and Rugman and Hodgetts (2003), to produce what we call
a nested, inverse-diamond, ie the twin, interlinked
economies here are such that one forms a subset of the
other. The twin economies are Nanjing and Greater
Shanghai (or the Yangtze Economic Delta as it is sometimes
called).
In addition, Porter (1990) identified two other factors that are important and
which apply equally well in this modified, diamond framework. Namely, the role
of government, which can influence any of the four, main factors by subsidies,
regulation, investment in education; and the role of chance events, and which
can shift competitive advantage in unpredictable ways such as war, inventions,
and oil price rises. Now, especially in Asia, some countries struggle with the
effects of war (Iraq), terrorism and the new ‘plague’ (SARS).
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Nanjing: Background and its FDI Activity Status
The Background of Nanjing
Nanjing is one of the famous cities of China in historic and cultural terms. Its
history can be traced some 2500 years; it is one of the six ancient capitals of
China, reputed to have been the capital of ten dynasties. Nanjing is the
provincial capital of Jiangsu and the second international commercial port after
Shanghai in the Yangtze Delta (Shanghai lies within the geographic confines of
Jiangsu but enjoys independent reporting lines to Beijing). The “golden
waterway”, the Yangtze River, flows through the city of Nanjing on its way to
the East China Sea. Nanjing (the ‘greater metropolis’) comprises some 6597
square kilometres, with a population of 5.53 million.
Nanjing is one of China’s important, industrial production bases with the
distinctive feature of heavy and chemical industries as the mainstay and is one of
the top ten trading cities. The production capacity in electronics and chemicals
is second in rank after Shanghai. Automobile manufacturing lies in third place.
While other industries are present on a considerable scale, the three major pillar
industries may be construed to be petrochemicals, auto industry and electronics
(and hence perhaps knowledge management) - a troika to which we return later. 
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Figure 1 The Nested-Double-Diamond (Nanjing and Greater Shanghai)
Greater
Shanghai
Nanjing
Nanjing is arguably the key transportation and telecommunication junction in
East China, with transport networks for large amounts of inbound, outbound
and through traffic (see Appendix). The networks have five components: air
(arguably under-utilised, see later), railway, highways, water and piping (key for
the petrochems feedstock inter alia). It has a modern telecommunication system.
It is also one of the four cities in the country which are key centres of scientific
research and education, especially higher education. In 2002, its GDP value was
RMB 130 billion (1$US= 8.3 RMB approx.), with a growth of 12 per cent over
the previous year (MGR, Nanjing, 2002).
As noted earlier, Nanjing lies some 300 kms west of Shanghai up the Yangtze
River, and Suzhou lies just 80 kms west of  Shanghai on the road to Nanjing.
These are important facts because of Shanghai’s status as China’s unofficial
financial capital, as well as its huge industry base, and Suzhou’s status as a key
development area within the Greater Shanghai economy, a fact underpinned by
explicit collaborative policies including efforts to strengthen the transport links
between the two Ss. Certainly, in terms of industrial (as distinct from financial
sector) development, Suzhou and Shanghai should best be regarded as a package,
or Suzhou is an integral part of Greater Shanghai. 
FDI-Activity Status
The data in Tables 2 and 3 give a snapshot of FDI activity in the Yangtze Delta
in the early years of the 21st century. They show that this region of China is
sharing in its parent’s post ‘Asian ‘flu’ recovery: first the 2000 data were modest
but by 2002 figures were sharply improved. The data in Table 3 represent a
strong performance on the FDI/GDP indicator by any standards (see Foster and
Alkan, 2003) but most especially a spectacular performance by Suzhou. There
are reasons for this, such as the positive governmental support including the
joint development zone project with Singapore and their success at attracting
Japanese investors (in some parts of China the unfortunate events of Japanese
rule in the late 1930s and during World War II are still a psychological block).
Comparing Nanjing with Suzhou and Shanghai suggests that Nanjing is
performing acceptably, taking the much bigger Shanghai as the benchmark, but
disappointingly relative to the municipality of Suzhou which is similar in size
(population) to Nanjing. For the Nanjing municipal government, the challenge
is to do ever better  and the nearby success of Suzhou suggests to them that this
should be possible. In crude benchmarking terms this seems clear but the task
now is to explore Nanjing’s current competences/regional specific advantages
(rather than CSAs) and its weaknesses in order to determine what may be the
way forward to meet these aspirations
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Nanjing Current Competences and Assessed Potential
Self Perceived Competences 
According to the information of the Nanjing municipal government, MGR
(2002), the main reasons for foreign multinational enterprises choosing Nanjing
as an investment destination are as follows.
◆ Advantageous Location
Nanjing is at the join of the Coastal and Yangtze Economic Belts, and
functions as a hub to radiate from the developed east coastal area to the
rather less developed western areas of China. As  noted above, it has five-
fold transport types including the modern (but under-utilised) Lukou
International Airport.
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Table 2: FDI Inflows Nanjing, Suzhou, Shanghai  (US$m)
City Pop 2002 (m) FDI 2000 FDI 2002
Nanjing 5.6 813 1502
Suzhou * 5.8 2883 4814
Shanghai 13.4 3160 5030
* The data for Suzhou are those recorded for the whole ‘greater municipality’:the
population figure in particular may seem high to some readers familiar with the
rather smaller ‘core city’, with a population well under 3m.
Table 3: FDI/GDP Ratio for Nanjing, Suzhou and Shanghai (as%)
City 2000 2001 2002
Nanjing 6.62 6.49 9.62
Suzhou 15.53 14.35 19.21
Shanghai 5.84 7.35 7.72
Source: Municipal Statistics for the three cities
◆ Advanced Science and Technology Base
Nanjing ranks third in its comprehensive science and technology
strength among the big cities in China. It has 577 independent and non-
independent R&D institutions, in which Zijinshan Observatory and
Nanjing Geology and Paleontology Research Institute are Class I
scientific institutes with considerable international fame. 
◆ Strong Higher Education Provision
Nanjing ranks third among all the cities of China in number of
institutions of higher education, next only to Beijing and Shanghai.
Nanjing University ranks number three in the country’s nine elite
research universities, according to its Executive Vice-President (interview
15th August, 2003).  
◆ An Important Industrial Base
Nanjing is already an important industrial base in East China,
accounting for about 1 per cent of the PRC’s total industrial capability
compared to a population share of 0.4 per cent. As  well as the pillar
industries already noted, it is emphasised that the hi-tech industry has
been developed vigorously. 
◆ Construction of Development Zones
There are nine development zones at provincial (or higher) level,
covering an aggregate area of 54.045 square km, with 3.445 billion Yuan
of development funds invested. The number of projects with foreign
investment and the amounts of actually utilised foreign fund respectively
account for one third of the city’s total. Nanjing Hi-tech Industrial
Development Zone, Nanjing Economic and Technology Development
Zone and Jiangning Economic and Technology Development Zone have
formed the development pattern featuring ‘Multiple Industrial Parks in
One Zone, Concerted Action of Three Zones, Mutual Compensation of
Superiorities and Each Zone with Its Own Characteristics’.
Evaluating Nanjing Using the Foster FDI-Screen
We now focus on looking at Nanjing using Foster’s framework, in order to
evaluate its potential attractiveness for would-be foreign investors. At the end of
the consideration of each attribute, a rating is offered on a seven point Likert-
scale.
F1: Infrastructure adequacy 
Nanjing’s municipal public utilities such as supply of electricity, tap water and
gas are well developed, as well as environmental protection. At present, the gas
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supply coverage comes up to 99.59% and the tap water coverage reaches 100%.
The 220-kV power transmission and transformation project has been completed
and put into service, realising the double-line operation of the city’s power
network. Tap water is also now available for people in all the 68 small towns on
the outskirts of Nanjing and in its neighbouring counties. The discharge of
industrial wastewater by the enterprises along the banks of the Yangtze River has
come up to the standards set by the state Bureau for Environmental Protection
in Beijing. 
The railways of Nanjing are key sections of the most important traffic route in
East China. Nanjing Yangtze River Bridge and the largest electrified and
mechanised modern marshalling yard for freight trains in East China link up the
networks of highways and railways on either side of the River. The four trunk
railways of Tianjin-to-Pukou (via Beijing), Shanghai-to-Nanjing, Nanjing-to-
Tongling and Anhui-to-Jiangxi all meet in Nanjing, connecting with major
trunk railways and large and medium sized cities all over China. There is a
major ‘doubling up’ project currently on the key Nanjing-Shanghai route. 
Nanjing Harbour is the largest inland river harbour in China and is geared up
for foreign trade. The harbour area extends for a total length of 98 kilometres
along the river. The Yangtze River is very wide here and the water is deep
enough to ensure navigation throughout the year and is available for berthing
vessels with a tonnage up to 35,000 dwt. The harbour area now has eight
anchorages, 180 wharves and 240 berths, of which sixteen are berths for over
10,000-ton vessels. Located in the harbour area is Xinshengwei foreign trade
port, which is a key project of the state and has an annual handling capacity of
nearly 10 million tons. The newly built railway that belongs to Xinshengwei
port links up with Beijing-Shanghai railway line.
Nanjing not only has a number of expressways and Class 1 highways that lead to
other provinces and cities, but also boasts a three-dimensional traffic frame with
“urban roads in a network, roads on the outskirts in rings, and fast and
convenient traffic leading to all directions”. This has fundamentally changed the
overall distribution of Nanjing’s traffic and transportation, rendering them much
faster moving and more convenient. Nanjing has four state highways, nine
provincial highways and nearly 2,000 highways at county and town levels and
for special purposes, with a total length of over 6,800 kilometres and a highway
intensity of 96 kilometres per hundred square kilometres. A highway network
has taken shape that connects trunk highways with branch ones and links up
counties and towns. The fast and convenient Shanghai-Nanjing Expressway
provides a prime land route for southern Jiangsu and the whole area of the
Yangtze River Delta. 
With the completion of Lukou International Airport in 1997, Nanjing now has
a quality facility. It provides service to a domestic aviation network with 65
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routes, serving 40 mainland cities There are international passenger services to
Hong Kong and Macao SARs, Taipei and Kaohsiung and charter routes to
Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok. There are also irregular freight routes to Nagoya,
and Miyazaki in Japan, Winnipeg, Canada, and Moscow. However, the
international network is limited and intra-PRC politics indicate that it is
unlikely to be allowed to develop to its full potential, because of Beijing’s policy
to develop and ‘protect’ Shanghai.
The major example of pipeline transportation in Nanjing is the Shandong-to-
Nanjing petroleum pipeline. It passes through the four provinces of Shandong,
Hebei, Anhui and Jiangsu and ends at the oil transit depot in Nanjing. A 344-
kilometre-long pipeline is laid in the territory of Jiangsu, with five relay pump
stations and Yizheng and Yangtze distribution stations. The completion of this
pipeline has laid a solid foundation for Nanjing’s important petrochemical
industry.
Nanjing is one of China’s eight major long-distance telecommunication
junctions. It has a communication network that is composed of multiple modes
of transmission, such as wire, cable, optical cable, microwave, short-wave and
satellite. 
The financial market needs of Nanjing enterprises may not be fully met within
the city, but its close proximity to Shanghai means that they can be readily
serviced.
Overall, the infrastructure can be said to be good, although not excellent, eg the
constraint on utilising the airport capacity effectively, and the perceived need to
be doing upgrade work on the Nanjing-Shanghai rail line. A score of 5/6 seems
to be appropriate. 
F2: Power adequacy
Right now, Nanjing’s power supply seems adequate but there has been a recent
scare whether Shanghai’s is robust. Complacency therefore has to be avoided.
A score of 6 is suggested. 
F3: Labour adequacy
Comparing Nanjing with other parts of China, this factor is quite good but still
not as good as might be found in the triad economies. There is a good provision
for education.
The city has 48 universities and colleges, which cover a variety of specialities,
have sufficient teaching staff and formally open the education information
- 10 -
network. Among them, Nanjing University, Southeast University, Nanjing
Normal University and Hehai University, plus several others with a specialist
focus are national key universities. It also has 323 middle schools, 53 technical
secondary schools, 1489 primary schools. This means that the city is in a
position to service the needs of  FIEs for both shop-floor and managerial labour
all appropriately educated, from the official view.
However, the thing which is still needed is improved capacity for independent
thought and action, plus even better English. The first author interviewed an
Austrian JV technician in Nanjing. He stated that, while he was surprised that
shop floor workers had any English ability, it was well short of being useful to
give direct rapid instructions in a safe way (interview at Lukou Airport, 22nd
August, 2003).
This overall need could be summed up as: “the need to see beyond the
traditional management style of the Chinese Boss to a more open, ‘international’
view”.
Overall, a score of 5 seems appropriate.
F4: Culture distance of Nanjing from investors’ home culture.
The point about labour understandings shows a cultural distance. The gap
between Germany (home of BASF, who have probably the city’s biggest JV in
partnership with Sinopec) or Sweden (Ericsson’s home) or the UK is quite big.
Using the Hofstede tool, power distances in China are much bigger for example
and many Chinese are unhappy with uncertainty in their job. 
Overall, this factor poses a problem. But as Foster and Minkes (1999) have
argued, these differences can be worked at with goodwill on both sides.
As at 2003, a score of 2 seems appropriate for (F4)c. This only means Nanjing
has the same problem as the rest of China for EU and US investment, not a
bigger one.
F5: Market potential
As noted in the introduction, the China market has huge potential. BASF state
it is one big reason for them to invest in China (see Wang, 2003) and this is
reinforced by the survey data which follows. With its good location and
transport links this aggregate demand should be freely available to Nanjing-
based enterprises. 
This factor should score 7.
- 11 -
F6: Country risk
Using the Economist scale, as suggested by Foster (2002), it can be estimated
that China’s country risk is middle ranking, a score of just under four for the
attribute’s complement seems plausible. Some bits of that scale are not a
problem (eg ethnic tension (certainly for Nanjing) islamic fundamentalism and
risk of civil war). The weaker points could be: authoritarianism (China is a one
party state with much power vested in Beijing, so Nanjing may not be allowed
to do some things it wants to), and corruption. On the latter, the central
government is officially committed to killing off corruption, but the lack of
transparency in some areas (including some difficulty found in obtaining
information by the authors) suggests that the opacities may conceal ‘problems’,
or behaviours which still do not bear scrutiny.
Taking all the scores for the six factors, gives this 6-tuple: (5/6, 6, 5, 2, 7, 4-) -
see also Figure 2 above for a diagrammatic representation. This is a positive
profile. The big issue to deal with is culture but, as noted, this is a solvable
problem if people really want to deal with it.
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Figure 2: The Foster FDI-Evaluation Framework
Scores Profile  (5/6, 6, 5, 2, 7, 4-)
(Subjective) Scoring of Nanjing as a potential FDI venue, as at 2003
| | |
1 4 7
F1 Infrastructure Adequacy *
F2 Power Availability *
F3 Labour Adequacy *
F4 [Cultural distance of host *
from ‘home’]c
F5 Market Potential (near term) *
F6 [Country Risk]c *
Nanjing Top-500 FIE Survey
During July and August 2003, the questionnaire outlined earlier was proposed
to 55 companies (FIEs) invested by the world’s 500 largest MNEs in Nanjing: a
total of 52 usable responses were obtained, 43 from joint ventures (JV) and 9
from wholly foreign owned enterprises (WFOE). The major industries
represented by these companies were electronics (18), chemicals (9), autos (7),
energy (3) and steel (1). The response rate means that we obtained a fairly
complete view for this particular type of venture in Nanjing, regarding the key
questions asked. One reason for getting such a good response rate may be
brevity of the questionnaire. The complementary downside is that we were not
able to obtain follow-up explanations of some of the interesting findings.  
The scale of investment in the respondent companies was distributed thus: ≤
$20m, 22; $(20 - 100)m, 23; $(100 – 500)m, 5; ≥ $500m, 2. The main reasons
cited for choosing Nanjing as the location for investment were:
◆ access to the huge PRC market
◆ prior activity in the sector
◆ convenient location and transport links. 
Figure 3 below illustrates the pattern of incidence of this sample of investments
over the past fifteen years. Since the sample captured 80 percent of this category
of investments, it can be seen to mirror overall activity rather well.
The graph shows that Nanjing had a strong performance in the first half of the
1990s, in terms of attracting FDI, but has ‘under-performed’ since then. They
were already slipping before the ‘Asian flu’ which struck in 1997/8 and their
continued slide until 2000 was much more severe than the pattern observed for
the PRC as a whole - the PRC essentially lost its growth (with a little absolute
shrinkage) in the immediate post-1997 phase. By 2000 a modest renewal of real
growth was in place and the years 2001 and 2002 saw very strong performance
with the culmination coming in 2002 when China became the world’s biggest
FDI sink for the first time.
Hence, Nanjing did not maintain its share of the PRC pool of FDI. That of
course means that other parts of the country have out-performed Nanjing. This
reinforces the question already posed: why did this poor relative performance
occur; and what can the city do to improve its position? In corporate strategy
language, the city seemed to have lost its apparent competitive advantage (CA)
of the pre-1996 period, and we could infer that underlying core competences
(CC) have been eroded. The question posed may be reformulated as: “can the
previous CCs be refurbished or, if not, what new CCs may be capable of
development to deliver a new CA”?
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Tables 4 and 5 show the degrees of satisfaction of the FIE’s with their enterprises
overall and with reference to the local labour force, showing separately the
satisfaction of the JVs and WFOEs. The degrees of satisfaction were expressed
on 5-point scales, with ‘1’ showing ‘not at all satisfied’ and ‘5’ indicating ‘totally
satisfied’.  
Table 4 shows a pattern of greater satisfaction overall among the JV foreign
investors than for the WFOEs, in that a higher percentage of the former group
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Table 4: Overall MNE Satisfaction Level with FDI Project [freqs]
FIE Type Score < 3 Score = 3 Score > 3 Total
JV 3 9 31 43
WFOE 0 3 6 9
Total 3 12 37 52
Main reasons for strong satisfaction (>3): market potential; labour cost/quality; good JV
partner for JVs; market and industry sector presence for WFOEs.
0
◆ ◆ ◆
◆
◆
◆
◆
◆
◆
◆
◆
◆
◆
1988 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
1
2
3
4
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9
Figure 3 Incidence of sample of FDIs by ‘500 Greatest Enterprises’ in
Nanjing: 1988-2002
expressed strong satisfaction. Table 5, dealing with satisfaction with the local
labour, shows a similar pattern to that for overall satisfaction. These tables can
be viewed as contingency tables where the enterprise type may be seen to
exercise influence on the satisfaction levels as noted. For both tables, we tested
whether the enterprise type was a significant predictor of the assessed
satisfaction, using x2-tests [we consolidated the tables into 2x2 form to avoid the
incidence of void cells]. In neither case was the visually observed trend found to
be statistically significant. 
However, this apparently neutral finding may have more import than at first
imagined. The reason is that a number of authors, mainly from the US, have
written articles recently suggesting that there are very clear benefits to
establishing FDI projects on a WFOE basis (when legally allowed), see for
example Vanhonacker (1997) and Deng (2001). If one starts from the premise
that WFOEs would be expected to deliver higher satisfaction levels than JVs (ie
this is the null hypothesis), then a statistically neutral finding (our results) can
be seen as evidence against that hypothesis. 
The finding about labour satisfaction is particularly intriguing given the oft
repeated mantra that “our organisation is first and foremost the people who
make it up”.
One possible explanation for the apparent greater satisfaction of the JVs with
their labour could be that the respective labour forces are actually of similar
calibre but the JVs have an advantage because the local partners are more
effective at managing the local labour. Alternatively, it could be that local
partners were able to ensure better hiring decisions at the outset in the JVs.
The other important data gleaned concerned key reasons why investors were
very satisfied (when they were), which supplements the earlier perceived aspects
- 15 -
Table 5: MNE Satisfaction with Local Employees in FDI Project [freqs]
FIE Type Score < 3 Score = 3 Score > 3 Total
JV 2 5 36 43
WFOE 0 2 7 9
Total 2 7 43 52
Main reasons for strong satisfaction (both firm types), in order: low cost, good supply, high
quality.
of attractiveness of Nanjing as an investment venue. These were in order of cited
frequency:
◆ access to large market
◆ prior presence of activity in segment
◆ low cost and high quality labour
◆ availability of a suitable partner (for JVs)
◆ efficient (local) government.
Nanjing’s Relation to Shanghai: the Nested-Double Diamond
This last sub-section deals with the fact that Shanghai is the driving force of the
Yangtze Delta and, hence, any plan for Nanjing’s development has to deal with
this reality. Recognising Shanghai’s status as the international economic,
financial and transportation centre of the Delta, Nanjing is already trying to
integrate with Shanghai in elements of the economy, culture and tourism, and to
utilise its relative advantage deriving from Shanghai’s disadvantages, for example,
the high (by PRC standards) cost of labour and land. 
We use the nested-double diamond to examine this linkage, making the analysis
pairs be clusters of industries for Nanjing and Greater Shanghai.
◆ Firm strategy, structure, and rivalry:
Greater Shanghai: more competitive but Porter would
argue that you must compete to be efficient or you die.
Nanjing: less intra-industry competition as a smaller
zone but also smaller market. Need to avoid sin of
laziness/complacency.
◆ Demand conditions:
Greater Shanghai and Nanjing: PRC as a whole can be
viewed as the market, all demanding wide range of goods
and real growth, as it increases in GDP/capital and
demand from consumers (eg this is why BASF has come
to China at all).
◆ Related and supporting industries:
Greater Shanghai and Nanjing: Across a wide range of
possible industries not all supporting industries may be
up to standard in short term - some Chinese suppliers
have to learn what quality supplier behaviour means the
hard way!
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◆ Factor conditions /infrastructure:
This is where it seems there may be some more
divergence between Greater Shanghai and Nanjing: most
factors are pretty good, but:
(i) Nanjing is relatively weak in air transport;
(ii) Shanghai now seems to be having its mini-power-
supply crisis - can they meet demand day by day?;
(iii) Nanjing is stronger than the Shanghai element of
Greater Shanghai on availability of land at a good price,
so this is where Nanjing can play its key role as a new
collaborative driving element of Greater Shanghai;
(iv) Greater Shanghai by virtue of Shanghai has good
financial sector developing; in that respect, Nanjing must
depend on Shanghai.
Hence, because Nanjing and Shanghai can complement each other in the ‘big’
diamond, we could say that, provided the municipal authorities co-operate
within Greater Shanghai, the possible links can be seen as a strength rather than
the threat that head-to-head analysis might suggest. 
Development of an FDI Strategy for Nanjing
In the light of the analysis thus far, we can now try to formulate an FDI
development strategy for Nanjing. 
The way in which Suzhou has prospered suggests that Nanjing may be advised
to include an element of integration with Shanghai; seek to complement
Shanghai’s economy.
Nanjing government policy as at 2003 is to develop ‘Greater Nanjing’ using a
classic hub-and-spoke, radial development pattern. The city has also pondered
an emphasis on five key or pillar industries (see paper/speech  by the Mayor,
Jiang, 2003)
The analysis of Nanjing’s situation thus far appears to offer at least four possible
advantages for the city of Nanjing:
◆ access for the whole of ‘Greater Nanjing’ (that is the
other smaller towns and cities, such as Yangzhou and
Zhenjiang in addition to the city itself ) to the key
transport major trunk routes
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◆ ample space by radiating outwards plus the possibility of
‘zoning’ for specific industrial sub-clusters
◆ acceptance, where appropriate, of Nanjing’s ‘subordinate
role’ to Shanghai, where Shanghai has a clear and obvious
primary advantage - the most obvious example which can
never change is Shanghai’s role as the premier financial
centre, not only for the Yangtze delta region but also for
the whole of the PRC
◆ another key advantage could be the IT/Knowledge
industry base already present in Nanjing. This is linked
in part to the strong university base and the presence of a
High Tech Development Zone on the north bank of the
Yangtze river. 
With regard to the above-mentioned situation, the following measures could be
taken in Nanjing to improve its competitiveness: 
◆ Transportation: especially expressways leading to Shanghai, should be
vigorously developed, and a high speed rail link, so that the travel time
between Shanghai and Nanjing can be reduced to one-and-a-half hours,
as well as further developing links to other major centres. As noted
before, although it would be beneficial to Nanjing to develop the
international network from Lukou airport, there are pressures from
Beijing against this at present.
◆ An advantageous environment for investment should be created to
upgrade the overall functions for opening up. A superior environment
for investment is the key to attracting investors and developing an open
economy. On the basis of a good existing foundation, the framework of
a modern metropolis should be extended on a large scale; centres for
scientific research, business interflow, financial information (in
conjunction with Shanghai), with easy to use promotion and registration
systems.
For example, the municipality’s Development Zones do have a ‘one-stop
shop’ facility to ease foreign investors’ official dealings, but outside the
zones life is  trickier. Also, the zones may ‘compete for signatures’ which
adds a new set of (avoidable) complexities. 
In relative terms, Nanjing is now ‘cheaper’ than Shanghai (or it should be so),
both in terms of land/property rentals and the fact that the whole place is more
compact than Shanghai - this means investors should have lower, local transport
costs.
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We say ‘should be’ because this will only be definitely true if there is fair and
transparent pricing of these key factors of production. The authors tried to gain
detailed information on these sorts of input data but found it hard to gain access
to clear answers. One possible explanation for this difficulty could be that the
officials asked feared giving a full and open answer. If that was true it would
suggest a less than transparent market place. 
It is proposed that it may be better to focus on just three pillar industries rather
than five; in the light of the evidence, the suggested ones are: electronic
information, petrochemical industry and vehicle production. The proposal to
limit to three is to try to develop real competences (CCs) genuinely, which will
indeed create overall competitive advantage and not run the risk of dissipating
energy. 
Relying on co-operation with research institutes, Nanjing could become a base
for R&D and software in the ‘Yangtze Delta’ economic zone, by constantly
enlarging the investment in the development funds in scientific research. This
would be a knowledge industry to complement the other two manufacturing
sectors. Among software research institutes in Nanjing, there are national
institutes, enterprises backed by research sectors of universities, such as Soft of
Nanjing University and Kejian of Southeast University. If this can be achieved it
could turn Nanjing into nationally important base for the software industry, and
possibly even an international base. As the Indians have shown, international
borders are not a barrier in the IT industry provided the key feedstock of
adequate personnel is available (although it has to be said that one big extra plus
for India to the prevalence of good English amongst the educated).
The notion of ‘sectoral zoning’ is attractive. To make a plan for this would be a
big task in its own and is beyond the scope of the space available here. It
requires detailed mapping (literally detailing on maps), linked to clustering of
related businesses, to smooth their respective supply chains and hence make
modern production techniques such as JIT possible. As one example,
development of the segment which BASF belongs to, petrochems, should clearly
be based round their new mega-project. 
Another thing to do here is to try to give the Nanjing-satellite cities a clear focus
and sense of identity within the overall plan.
Transparency and visibility are two extra factors the municipality can work on
for the benefit of ‘Greater Nanjing’. We focus on these because the first is an
issue still in China generally, and the latter because the city ‘suspects’ it has
problems here. 
Since it is not universally true that there is transparency in China, if Nanjing can
make it true there, this will be a genuine source of competitive advantage for the
city - in the eyes of western investors anyway. This is supported by a recent
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report by OECD (2003) on China’s FDI potential and what it needs to do to
realise it. This suggests that historic advantages such as market potential and low
cost base are not likely to be sufficient for much longer. It proposes that China
needs to develop a more transparent environment with a clear legal and
regulatory framework. Even more key, we would argue, is honest and
transparent dealing relative to these frameworks, if and when established.
On visibility, the city has been disappointed by the external response to some
recent promotional fairs and direct scrutiny showed that some of its written
promotional materials were not of high quality. Thus there are two things to do:
◆ the city’s profile as an industrial hub with certain
specialisations has to be communicated to the wider
world
◆ the quality of the promotional material has to be
improved; some of the English in the sections for
foreigners is not as good as it should be. Hiring quality
designers and translators (or maybe native speakers with
direct knowledge of the subject matter, eg engineers for
text about engineering) could readily solve this problem.
Conclusion
The conclusions to be drawn from the foregoing sections can be looked at in
two groups. First there are the findings from the assessment of Nanjing as a
potential FDI-sink within the PRC. These may be summed up thus: 
◆ Nanjing has underperformed recently in terms of
attracting its share of the PRC’s inbound FDI
◆ Nanjing does have certain obvious regional specific
advantages, including: location within PRC, transport
infrastructure and potential for further development of
that system, space (land etc), and a cluster of higher
education provision
◆ there are a set of existing pillar industries which offer the
potential for further development: within that it is
suggested that the city may prudently focus on three in
particular - petrochemicals, autos and electronics/
knowledge management
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◆ the FDI-development strategy must recognise Nanjing’s
position within Greater Shanghai and leverage the
structural assets available in the link where possible (eg
the capital market facilities), while stressing its
comparative advantages within the wider region
◆ the city needs to promote itself and its attributes more
extensively and professionally in order to reach out to
potential foreign investors
◆ it is suggested that Nanjing could gain an advantage over
other PRC cities by promoting genuine transparency in
businesses located within the city, both in business-to-
business dealings but, more crucially, in their dealings
with municipal, provincial and state governmental
bodies.  
From the perspective of the inward investor, the findings of the survey
conducted are interesting. In particular, the greater satisfaction perceived by
MNEs whose investment is via JV rather than WFOE should be noted,
especially given recent writings suggesting the inverse emphasis. Further
investigation of the reasons for the reported perceptions would be helpful. 
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